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Gas Tax Agreements in Indian Country 
 
Jonathan White1 
 
It is long past time that the Indian policies of the Federal government began to 
recognize and build upon the capacities and insights of the Indian people. Both 
as a matter of justice and as a matter of enlightened social policy, we must begin 
to act on the basis of what the Indians themselves have long been telling us. The 
time has come to break decisively with the past and to create conditions for a 
new era in which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian 
decisions. . . . 
This, then, must be the goal of any new national policy toward the Indian people: 
to strengthen the Indian’s sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of 
community. We must assure the Indian that he can assume control of his own life 
without being separated involuntarily from the tribal group. And we must make it 
clear that Indians can become independent of Federal control without being cut 
off from Federal concern and Federal support. . . . 
For years we have talked about encouraging Indians to exercise greater self-
determination, but our progress has never been commensurate with our 
promises. . . . 
This situation should be reversed.2 
---President Richard M. Nixon, July 8, 1970 
 
Introduction 
 
 After nearly 200 years of a shifting and confusing federal policy toward its 
indigenous peoples, the United States embarked upon an ambitious new direction 
during the mid-1960s. Still smarting from the diminishment of both tribal sovereignty and 
the trust land base as a result of the government’s previous policy of termination, Indian 
tribes, bolstered by several recent court decisions and a burgeoning civil rights 
movement, began to demand more self-determination. The federal government agreed, 
and the successive decades have seen a dramatic increase in tribal sovereignty. 
However, along with sovereignty came added visibility and new conflicts, as the 565 
federally-recognized tribes began to assert themselves against their own members and 
their neighbors. “Ultimately, during the modern era, the tribes have used their sovereign 
status in numerous, pragmatic ways to rise from the termination era and gain a place, 
new though it may be, in the community of governments in the United States.”3 This has 
given tribes some momentum, but it has also generated a great deal of resistance. 
 
 One of the areas in which tribes have been reasserting sovereignty is taxation 
authority. Since 1995, tribes in Washington have been entering into agreements with 
the state, providing a mechanism under which tribes may keep the majority of the usual 
state gas taxes levied on consumers. This program has grown significantly, to the point 
                                                            
1 J.D. Candidate 2012, Seattle University School of Law 
2 H.R.DOC. NO. 91-363, (1970).   
3 CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 54 (Yale University Press 1987). 
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where the majority of Washington tribes are now taking advantage of it. These 
agreements have provided millions of dollars of desperately needed revenue and jobs 
to Washington tribes, allowing tribes to provide much-needed transportation and police 
improvements within their respective reservations. 
 
 However, this cooperative form of shared sovereignty has also resulted in an 
incredible amount of controversy in the state, with non-tribal gas stations and 
conservative policy think-tanks alleging that the gas tax arrangement is illegal under the 
state Constitution and that the tribes are enjoying financial benefits which allow them to 
sell gasoline at greatly reduced rates. These reduced rates, argue opponents of the tax 
arrangements, allow tribes to undercut prices at gas stations operated by non-tribal 
members, putting them at a serious competitive disadvantage. The issue has generated 
additional heat since the beginning of the current economic recession and rise of the 
“tea party” movement, with many citizens complaining that the gas tax arrangements 
are nothing more than illegal giveaways of public funds to Indian tribes. The controversy 
has recently reached a tipping point, and in 2011 opponents of the gas tax agreements 
brought suit against the state and Governor Gregoire to challenge their 
constitutionality.4 
 
 This paper argues that gas tax agreements between the state and tribes cannot, 
and should not, be disturbed through legal actions undertaken by disaffected citizens. 
When challenging the legitimacy of government-to-government negotiations, the proper 
avenue for redress is the ballot box, not the court system. This paper will first discuss 
the legal background of taxation in Indian Country throughout the United States, 
showing how the United States Supreme Court has moved to sharply limit tribal 
sovereignty, especially in the area of taxation, over the past thirty years. The paper will 
next discuss the specifics of the Washington gas tax arrangements, including details of 
the provisions at stake in the case now before the Washington Supreme Court. The 
paper will then explain how cooperative taxation agreements between tribes and the 
state fit into the overall policy goals of the federal government, by allowing tribes to 
reassert sovereignty and provide needed services to their members. The paper will then 
discuss a current case, Automotive United Trades Organization v. State of Washington, 
first by identifying the parties to the case, and then by discussing the proceeding at 
court. The paper will briefly discuss the disposition of similar issues in other jurisdictions 
before concluding with analysis of the gas-tax-agreements issue in Washington and its 
relation to the larger goals of sovereignty and self-determination for Indian tribes. 
 
Background – Taxation in Indian Country 
 
The first major case dealing with the issue of taxation in Indian Country during 
the self-determination era was Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State Tax Commission.5 
In that case, the state of Arizona levied a two percent tax on the gross proceeds, sales, 
and gross income of the plaintiff’s trading post, which sold goods to Indians on the 
                                                            
4 Auto. United Trades Org. v. State, No. 85661-3 (Wash. accepted for hearing and decision Sept. 7, 
2011).  
5 Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).  
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Navajo reservation.6 The Trading Post had been granted a federal license to trade with 
the Indians,7 and the Supreme Court looked specifically at the issue of whether Arizona 
had the authority to levy a tax on a business dealing with Indians in Indian Country.8 
The Court then cited the agreement signed by Arizona upon its admission to the Union, 
in which the state expressly forfeited jurisdiction over Indian Country, in deference to the 
federal government, as a condition of admission.9 
 
The Court relied on Justice John Marshall’s famous holding in Worcester v. 
Georgia, in which he stated that the “treaties and laws of the United States contemplate 
that the Indian territory is completely separated from that of the states; and provide that 
all intercourse with them should be carried on exclusively by the government of the 
Union.”10 The Warren Court then looked at specific regulations of Indian commerce, 
from the first statutes enacted under the Constitution, up to the present day, finding that 
the history of “these apparently all-inclusive regulations and the statutes authorizing 
them would seem in themselves sufficient to show that Congress has taken the 
business of Indian trading on reservations so fully in hand that no room remains for 
state laws imposing additional burdens.” 11  The Court concluded with a strong 
reaffirmation of taxation as a positive method of promoting and strengthening tribal 
sovereignty: 
Congress has, since the creation of the Navajo Reservation 
nearly a century ago, left the Indians on it largely free to run 
the reservation and its affairs without state control, a policy 
which has automatically relieved Arizona of all burdens for 
carrying on those same responsibilities. And in compliance 
with its treaty obligations the Federal Government has 
provided for roads, education and other services needed by 
the Indians   . . .  This state tax on gross income would put 
financial burdens on appellant or the Indians with whom it 
deals in addition to those Congress or the tribes have 
prescribed (emphasis added), and could thereby disturb and 
disarrange the statutory plan Congress set up in order to 
protect Indians against prices deemed unfair or 
unreasonable by the Indian Commissioner. And since 
federal legislation has left the State with no duties or 
responsibilities respecting the reservation Indians, we cannot 
believe that Congress intended to leave to the State the 
privilege of levying this tax.12 
 
                                                            
6 Id. at 685. 
7 25 U.S.C. § 261 (giving the BIA commissioner “sole power” to appoint traders to the Indian tribes, and to 
regulate the manner in which they traded, including quantity of goods and pricing). 
8 Warren Trading Post, supra note 4, at 685. 
9 Id. at 686. 
10 Id. at 687 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 557 (1832)). 
11 Id. at 690. 
12 Id. at 690-91. 
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Eight years later, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of the validity of state 
taxation in Indian Country in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission.13 In that 
case, the state of Arizona had withheld $16.20 from the wages of an enrolled member 
of the Navajo tribe to cover her 1967 state income tax liability.14 The Arizona state 
courts had affirmed the tax even in light of the Warren Trading Post decision, holding 
that a state income tax levied upon an individual did not infringe upon a tribe’s ability to 
govern itself.15 
 
 The Supreme Court reversed the Arizona courts, again applying Worcester to 
restate the doctrine that Indian nations were “distinct political communities” and that 
tribes had exclusive authority over all the lands within their territory.16 Employing a 
balancing test to weigh the interests of the federal government and tribes against those 
of the state, the Court thus reaffirmed the fact that, although there were some 
exceptions, state law had “no role to play” within reservation boundaries, absent an 
express act of Congress giving the state such authority.17 The Court also looked at the 
history of the treaties between the United States and the Navajo to find that the tribe 
had never expressly agreed to state authority; even if it had, the Court relied on the 
Indian Canons of Construction, which require treaty provisions to be construed “in favor 
of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon 
its protection and good faith.”18 Thus, federal and tribal interests prevailed over any 
state interest, and the Court accordingly held in favor of tribal authority to tax as a 
means of upholding sovereignty: 
When this canon of construction is taken together with the 
tradition of Indian independence described above, it cannot 
be doubted that the reservation of certain lands for the 
exclusive use and occupancy of the Navajos and the 
exclusion of non-Navajos from the prescribed area was 
meant to establish the lands as within the exclusive 
sovereignty of the Navajos under general federal supervision 
(emphasis added). It is thus unsurprising that this Court has 
interpreted the Navajo treaty to preclude extension of state 
law—including state tax law—to Indians on the Navajo 
Reservation.19 
 
 Seven years later, in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville 
Reservation, the Supreme Court took another major case involving issues of state 
taxation in Indian Country.20 Colville dealt with a set of facts similar to the current gas 
taxation controversy: Indian retailers were marketing and selling cigarettes for 
significantly less than their non-tribal competitors, and those competitors sued, alleging 
                                                            
13 McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
14 Id. at 166. 
15 Id. at 165. 
16 Id. at 170-71. 
17 Id. at 168. 
18 Id. at 174 (quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930)). 
19 Id. at 174-75. 
20 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
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the tribes were enjoying a competitive advantage. 21  While reaffirming notions of 
sovereignty found in the preceding two cases, the Court distinguished this case from 
other cases involving similar issues, by discussing only the validity of the state’s ability 
to impose the cigarette tax on non-tribal citizens.22 The Court quickly established the 
fact that the state had no authority to tax tribal members buying cigarettes on the 
reservation.23 Thus, the main issue was whether the state could impose its own tax on 
its own citizens who went into the reservation to purchase cigarettes at a lower rate. 
 
 The Court found that taxes imposed by states on nonmembers do not frustrate 
federal interests because the federal courts could immediately strike down any taxes 
which they felt interfered with the trust relationship.24 Next, the Court found that the 
state tax would indeed destroy the tribal competitive advantage, but at the same time, 
the Court did not think that any of the federal statutes passed for the benefit of Indians 
(Indian Reorganization Act, Indian Financing Act, etc.) granted tribes this advantage.25 
Next, the Court found that the state tax did not infringe on tribal self-government, 
because the tax only applied to sales to nonmembers.26 The Court concluded that the 
cigarette tax did not "burden commerce" and that each sovereign government (the 
Colville Tribe and the state of Washington) was free to impose its own taxes without 
interfering with the other.27  
 
Colville represented a significant departure from the Court’s previous 
jurisprudence on state taxation in Indian Country, as the Court began to use its own 
balancing test to favor state interests over those of the federal government and tribes. 
Nowhere in the Court’s decision was there any discussion of the underlying 
fundamental principles of tribal sovereignty, as discussed in Worcester, which had 
informed so much of the basic rationale of the Warren Trading Post and McClanahan 
cases.28 Instead, the Court focused primarily on the distinctions between tribal members 
and nonmembers or between trust lands and non-trust lands, as well as continually 
returning to the issue of the competitive advantage enjoyed by the tribal retailers.29 
While agreeing that tribes did have some legitimate reasons for such a taxation 
scheme, the Court ultimately held that “the State’s interest in taxing these purchasers 
outweighs any tribal interest that may exist in preventing the State from imposing its 
taxes.”30 A strongly written concurrence in part, and dissent in part, by then-Justice 
Rehnquist, gave an indication of the court’s coming direction on the issues of 
sovereignty and taxation: “If Indians are to function as quasi co-sovereigns with the 
                                                            
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 136. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 154 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 at 208-10 (1978); United States v. 
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 at 326 (1978)). 
25 Id. at 155-56. 
24 See id. at 156-57.  
27 Id. at 157-59.  
28 A noble dissent in part and concurrence in part from Justices Brennan and Marshall did attempt to 
invalidate the state tax based primarily on notions of tribal sovereignty and federal domination of the 
subject area. Id. at 164-73. 
29 Id. at passim. 
30 Id. at 161. 
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States, they like the States, must adjust to the economic realities of that status as every 
other sovereign competing for tax revenues, absent express intervention by 
Congress.”31 
 
Justice Rehnquist would eventually have his say twenty-one years later, when, 
as Chief Justice, he wrote the unanimous opinion for the Court in Atkinson v. Shirley.32 
While the facts of that case are not as applicable to the current controversy (it dealt with 
tribal taxation of a non-Indian owner of a hotel located within the boundaries of the 
Navajo reservation), the case did represent a significant setback for tribes as 
sovereigns and for the notion of taxation as a means of reinforcing that sovereignty. 
Relying on the arguably-inconsistent Montana test,33 which states that tribes have no 
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians for activities taking place within non-Indian land except 
in situations where a consensual relationship or threat to tribal political integrity exists, 
the Court held that the modern notion of inherent sovereignty disallowed tribal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers, even if they were located within the reservation.34 This 
was primarily based upon the status of the land in question (held in fee by the tribal non-
member, and thus outside of the tribe’s trust land base), not upon whether creation of 
such a jurisdictional black hole would affect the tribe’s sovereignty.35 
 
This new direction from the Supreme Court, hinted at in Rehnquist’s dissent 
twenty five years prior in Colville, and ripened into a holding by way of Atkinson, further 
restricted notions of taxation as a means of supporting and encouraging tribal 
sovereignty. While purporting to treat tribes the same as states for the purposes of 
economic competition, the Court severely restricted their sovereign status by failing to 
equate it with that of a state (and arguably, by elevating the state in deeming state 
interests primary). Instead of giving tribes some leeway to develop a jurisdictional base 
through the implementation of one of the most basic functions of sovereignty (taxation 
and revenue generation), the Court instead poked large holes into the small amount of 
sovereignty tribes thought they had reserved, first by way of treaties, then by way of the 
precedents in Warren Trading Post and Atkinson. With the backing, or at least the 
implicit philosophical encouragement, of the highest court in the land, citizens and 
organizations have been challenging tribal sovereignty on several grounds in recent 
years. Because sovereign immunity prevents these plaintiffs from directly suing the 
tribes themselves, opponents of tribal sovereignty have instead directed their lawsuits at 
other targets, such as states. 
 
                                                            
31 Id. at 186. 
32 Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647 (2001). 
33 A discussion of the validity of the Montana test (derived from Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 
(1981)) is well beyond the subject or scope of this paper. Suffice it to say, for purposes of this paper, that 
the cases cited for its two famous “exceptions” do not necessarily support the propositions for which they 
are employed by the Court. The continued use of this test, under such circumstances, is a good example 
of one of the major problems within the realm of Federal Indian law: important and binding precedent is 
often casually discarded without reason or explanation, and new precedent is put in its place without 
much hindsight or policy-based justification. 
34 Atkinson, supra note 31, at 647. 
35 Id. at 654. 
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The Washington Gas Tax Agreements 
 
 Authority for the gas tax agreements between the state and the tribes is found in 
the Revised Code of Washington (RCW) and was most recently updated in 2007. Most 
of the current controversy comes from section 3 of the statute: 
(3) If a new agreement is negotiated, the agreement must: 
(a) Require that the tribe or the tribal retailer acquire all motor vehicle fuel 
only from persons or companies operating lawfully in accordance with this 
chapter as a motor vehicle fuel distributor, supplier, importer, or blender, or from 
a tribal distributor, supplier, importer, or blender lawfully doing business 
according to all applicable laws; 
 (b) Provide that the tribe will expend fuel tax proceeds or equivalent 
amounts on: Planning, construction, and maintenance of roads, bridges, and 
boat ramps; transit services and facilities; transportation planning; police 
services; and other highway-related purposes;   
 
 (c) Include provisions for audits or other means of ensuring compliance to 
certify the number of gallons of motor vehicle fuel purchased by the tribe for 
resale at tribal retail stations, and the use of fuel tax proceeds or their equivalent 
for the purposes identified in (b) of this subsection. Compliance reports must be 
delivered to the director of the department of licensing.36 
 
The State of Washington currently has gas tax arrangements, pursuant to RCW 
82.36.450, with 22 of the 29 federally-recognized tribes in the state.37  
 
 Under the terms of the agreements, the tribe collects the full amount of the 
State’s current gas tax and submits the money to the State.38 Of that revenue, 75 
percent is then redistributed back to the tribe, which is legally obligated to use it for 
transportation purposes under section 3(b) of the RCW. 39  The state keeps the 
remaining 25 percent of the tax as its own revenue.40 Tribes are then required to submit 
                                                            
36 RCW 82.36.450. The legislative history behind this enactment contains an interesting note on 
legislative recognition and belief, which is applicable here:  
"The legislature recognizes that certain Indian tribes located on reservations within this state 
dispute the authority of the state to impose a tax upon the tribe, or upon tribal members, based 
upon the distribution, sale, or other transfer of motor vehicle and other fuels to the tribe or its 
members when that distribution, sale, or other transfer takes place upon that tribe's reservation. 
While the legislature believes it has the authority to impose state motor vehicle and other fuel 
taxes under such circumstances, it also recognizes that all of the state citizens may benefit from 
resolution of these disputes between the respective governments." [1995 c 320 § 1] [emphasis 
added]. 
37 Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing, 2010 Tribal Fuel Tax Agreement Report, updated February 2011, 
http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/NR/rdonlyres/97C37EB3-7DBC-4992-B790-
CBAC914D7DDF/0/Apr192011Updated2010FuelTaxAgreementReport.pdf.  
38 Scott Gutierrez, Republicans want to revisit tribal gas tax refunds, SEATTLEPI.COM (Mar. 16, 2011), 
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/transportation/article/Republicans-want-to-revisit-tribal-gas-tax-refunds-
1230552.php. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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annual reports to the state Department of Licensing (DOL) to show that they are 
complying with the regulation that they only using those funds for transportation-related 
purposes. 41  However, these audit reports are exempt from public disclosure 
requirements, and the tribe is allowed to choose who can perform the audit.42 These 
agreements have generated significant funds for Washington tribes. According to the 
DOL, tribes received $31.72 million from November 1, 2009, to December 31, 2010, 
under the gas tax agreements.43 
 
The Current Controversy and the Pending Case before the Washington Supreme 
Court 
 
 As can be expected in nearly every situation in which a tribe appears to be 
receiving a benefit that is not concurrently provided to all citizens, non-tribal entities 
have complained that tribes were getting special treatment. The issue was first raised 
by the Automotive United Trades Organization of Washington (AUTO), which bills itself 
as a “nonprofit trade association of motor fuel retailers and suppliers doing business in 
Washington state.”44 AUTO, seeing the millions of dollars in reimbursements to tribes as 
lost potential revenue, contends that the money received by Washington tribes as a 
result of these gas tax agreements is being used for purposes other than what is strictly 
allowed in the statute.45 Specifically, AUTO claims that tribes are using the money from 
the state reimbursements to subsidize fuel costs and permit tribal gas retailers to sell 
gas at a lower price than their non-tribal competitors. 46  In its brief, AUTO alleges 
constitutional violations and seeks an injunction on state refund payments to tribes 
under the gas tax agreements.47 
 
 In its reply, the State immediately calls the challenge to the gas tax agreements 
an issue of sovereign immunity: “The effect of sovereign immunity, as with judicial or 
any other immunity, on a particular case may seem harsh, but the recognition of 
immunities is a reflection of well established policy decisions” (emphasis added).48 In 
other words, while AUTO might have a legitimate complaint that its members are being 
treated unfairly, its recourse should be at the ballot box and not in the courts. “Implicitly 
recognizing the bar imposed by tribal sovereign immunity, the Plaintiff has sued only 
one of the parties to the agreement it seeks to eviscerate . . . [t]he reason Plaintiff has 
not included the Tribes in this suit is simple: the Tribes are immune from suit as 
sovereign governments.”49 
                                                            
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing, supra note 36. 
44 AUTOMOTIVE UNITED TRADES ORGANIZATION HOME PAGE, http://www.autowa.org/. 
45 Brief of Appellant at 8-9, Auto. United Trades Org. v. State, No. 85661-3 (filed Apr. 15, 2011). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 1 
48 Memorandum in Support of State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint For Failure 
to Join Indispensable Parties at 2, Auto. United Trades Org. v. State, No. 10-2-00599-1 (filed Nov. 12, 
2010). 
49 Brief of Respondent at 3, Auto. United Trades Org. v. State, No. 85661-3 (filed June 24, 2011) (quoting 
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991)). 
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At trial, the case turned largely on procedural issues, with the trial court holding 
that tribes are necessary parties to any litigation which would deprive them of their 
contractually-expected fuel payments.50  This decision was based on CR 19, which 
requires the joinder of necessary parties to any case that could affect their interests.51 
Tribal sovereign immunity, which was never waived, prevented AUTO from joining the 
tribes as a defendant. When AUTO tried to amend its complaint to include the tribes, 
that motion was denied.52 In his motion to dismiss the case for lack of a necessary 
party, Grays County Superior Court Judge Gordon Godfrey lamented that the 
procedural issues raised by CR 19 did not allow him to decide the case on its merits: “I 
do find one thing repugnant in the whole situation, that in our system of government . . . 
there is no judicial remedy [for those wishing to challenge the legitimacy of such 
agreements]. I do believe that . . . this is an issue that needs to be addressed by our 
Supreme Court.”53 
 
On September 7, 2011, the Washington State Supreme Court agreed with Judge 
Godfrey, accepting review of the case.54 The Supreme Court will ultimately decide 
whether sovereign immunity prevents the joinder of a tribe as a necessary party to 
litigation challenging government-to-government negotiations between two sovereign 
entities. The Supreme Court will need to overturn significant precedent if it holds that 
the tribes should be joined to the litigation, because two recent appellate decisions have 
upheld CR 19’s dismissal requirements in cases similar to the current case (see below). 
Both cases involved challenges to state/tribal agreements by individuals who were not 
parties to the negotiations and who were unhappy with how those negotiations turned 
out. But in both cases, the tribes were deemed necessary and indispensable parties, 
requiring that both cases be dismissed.  
 
In Matheson v. Gregoire, a Puyallup tribal member brought suit against the tribe, 
seeking the nullification of taxation agreements between the tribe and the State 
regarding cigarettes.55 A state statute, similar to those in the AUTO case, governed 
those agreements; the revenue-sharing agreements were also similar, with the State 
agreeing to refund 70 percent of revenue from cigarette taxes.56  The tribe is then 
obligated to peg the tribal-imposed tax at the same level as that of the state, and to only 
buy cigarettes from state-licensed wholesalers.57 The appellate court dismissed the 
                                                            
50 Id. at 8. 
51 Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication, WASH. CT. R. 19. 
52 Order Denying Motion, Judge Gordon Godfrey. Automotive United Trades Organization v. Washington; 
Christine Gregoire. No. 10-2-00599-1, Grays County Superior Court, Feb. 15, 2011. 
53 Erik Smith, Republicans Fume About Indian Gas-Tax Deal, WASHINGTON STATE WIRE, Mar. 20, 2011, 
http://www.washingtonstatewire.com/home/8105-
republicans_on_the_warpath_about_indian_gas_tax_money.htm. 
54 Letter Accepting Review of Case, Auto. United Trades Org. v. State, No. 85661-3 (filed Sept. 7, 2011). 
55 Matheson v. Gregoire, 139 Wn. App. 624, 627-28 (2007). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
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case, ultimately holding that “the tribal interest in immunity overcomes the lack of an 
alternative remedy or forum for plaintiffs.”58 
 
Two years later, a similar case, Mudarri v. State, involved a challenge, this time 
from a non-tribal business competitor, to agreements signed between the Puyallup tribe 
and the State, permitting the tribe to operate electronic scratch ticket games.59 This 
case featured a nearly identical constitutional attack on the state-tribal agreements to 
the AUTO case. Again, the court dismissed, primarily on CR 19 grounds, but also 
because the Court found the tribe to be a necessary party to any action seeking to 
invalidate a contract to which the tribe is a party.60 The Court took the additional step of 
holding that, because of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff’s claims could not be 
adequately adjudicated, and that therefore the entire matter should be dismissed.61 
 
Matheson and Mudarri involved lawsuits that had the ultimate goal of effectively 
nullifying state-tribal agreements. But in both of those cases, the plaintiffs did not join 
the necessary parties (the tribes themselves). Under CR 19(a), whether a party is 
necessary depends on whether the absent party has a legally protected interest relating 
to the action.62 Such an absent party is necessary if the matter to be decided in its 
absence would “(A) as a practical matter impair or impede [its] ability to protect that 
interest, or (B) leave any of the persons already parties subject to substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations be reason of [its] 
claimed interest.”63 
 
The 9th Circuit supported reasoning similar to the holdings in Matheson and 
Mudarri through its decision in Wilbur v. Locke.64 That case involved a cigarette tax 
agreement between the Swinomish tribe and the State that, like the agreements in the 
present case, provided the tribe with tax money that the tribe agreed to spend for 
“essential government purposes.”65 Again, the plaintiffs (here, members of the tribe 
itself, who believed that any agreement on taxation between the state and the tribe was 
illegal under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution) did not join the 
tribe as a party to the suit. At trial in federal court, the State moved to dismiss pursuant 
to FRCP 19.66 This motion was denied, because the district court held that the tribe was 
not a necessary party.67 But the 9th Circuit reversed the district court, and dismissed the 
action, primarily on the basis that the tribe was a necessary and indispensable party.68 
                                                            
58 Id. at 636. 
59 Mudarri v. State, 147 Wn. App. 590, 594 (2008). 
60 Id. at 604. 
61 Id. at 605. 
62 WASH. CT. R. 19, supra note 50. 
63 Id. 
64 Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 2005). 
65 Id. at 1104-05. 
66 Analogous to WASH. CT. R. 19, supra note 50. 
67 Wilbur, supra note 63, at 1105. 
68 Id. at 1114. 
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The Court held that “because the Tribe has an interest in retaining the rights granted by 
the tax agreement, the requirement of a ‘legally protected’ interest is satisfied.”69 
 
 The Matheson/Mudarri/Wilbur line of cases is practically indistinguishable from 
the AUTO case, both in terms of facts and in terms of relevant law. The trial court was 
well within its discretion dismissing AUTO’s suit, regardless of Judge Godfrey’s 
consternation in doing so. However, while this issue seems well settled in Washington, 
it is less settled elsewhere. Considering the United States Supreme Court’s recent 
moves to limit nearly all forms of tribal sovereignty to their bare minimum, a jurisdictional 
split between state or federal courts could easily lead to a situation in which the 
Supreme Court agrees to take another look at the whole state/tribal tax-sharing arena.   
 
 Very recently, in Salton Sea Venture, Inc. v. Ramsey, a federal district court had 
the opportunity to review a similar case from southern California.70 In Salton Sea, the 
owners of a fuel station/convenience store brought suit against a tribally-operated gas 
station, alleging, among several other issues, that the tribe was selling gas at illegally 
low rates, which had a negative effect on the plaintiff’s business.71 In an opinion that 
continually relied on and referred to tribal sovereignty and immunity, Chief Judge Irma 
Gonzalez denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction primarily on FRCP 19 
grounds.72 Judge Gonzalez found that the first three factors of FRCP 19 weighed in 
favor of dismissal,73 and that the only factor weighing in favor of the plaintiff was the lack 
of an alternative forum.74 Relying on 9th Circuit precedent, Judge Gonzalez said that 
“tribal interest in immunity overcomes the lack of an alternative remedy or forum for the 
plaintiffs.”75 
 
 Conversely, in StoreVisions v. Omaha Tribe of Neb., the Nebraska State 
Supreme Court recently issued an opinion limiting the effect, or at least the incidence, of 
sovereign immunity.76 Although that case involved more of a contractual issue, and 
turned largely on issues of waiver of sovereign immunity (discussed in the AUTO and 
other Washington cases, supra, but not the key issue in those cases), the Nebraska 
                                                            
69 Id at 1112. 
70 Salton Sea Venture, Inc. v. Ramsey, No. 11cv1968-IEG (WMG), 2011 WL 4945072 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 
2011) preliminary motion for injunction denied. 
71 Id. at 1. 
72 Id. at passim. 
73 Id. at 8-9. “Plaintiff’s action seeks to place restrictions on the sale of fuel at the Red Earth Travel 
Center. Therefore, the Torres-Martinez tribe and the Selnak-is Corp. would suffer severe prejudice by not 
being parties to an action that challenges their ability to sell fuel at their travel center and raise revenue to 
support the tribal economy. In addition, because the sale of fuel at the Red Earth Travel Center is the 
focus of Plaintiff’s action, no partial remedy can be fashioned that would not implicate those interests or 
would eliminate the prejudice to those two non-parties. Further, adequate relief could not be awarded 
without including the Torres-Martinez tribe and the Selnak-is Corp. as part of the injunction because they 
own and control the travel center at issue. Accordingly, the first three factors likely all favor dismissal of 
the action.” Id. at 6. 
74 Id. at 9. 
75 Id. at 6, quoting Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 2002). 
76 StoreVisions v. Omaha Tribe of Neb., 281 Neb. 238, 240 (2011), cert. denied 132 S.Ct. 1016 (2012). 
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Supreme Court’s refusal to apply accepted Supreme Court precedent77 led the Omaha 
Tribe to file a recent petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, alleging 
that the “Nebraska Supreme Court erred in allowing StoreVisions to rely on the 
representations of two tribal council members, attribute those actions to being those of 
the tribe, and conclude the tribe had waived sovereign immunity.” 78  Although the 
Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari in that case,79 it is certainly an issue upon 
which advocates of tribal sovereignty and self-determination should remain focused. 
 
Analysis and Conclusion 
 
 The United States has enjoyed the benefits and privileges—as well as the 
responsibilities—of self-determination for over two centuries. Roughly forty years ago, 
the nation embarked upon a policy designed to finally allow Indian tribes to experience 
many of the benefits of self-determination. President Nixon’s call for the nation to finally 
live up to its promises was inspired at the time, and Indian tribes today have arguably 
never been better off. Borrowing a familiar form of nomenclature from Hollywood, the 
self-determination era might well be characterized as Promise II. But are we, as a 
nation, truly living up to Promise II?  
 
General federal policy toward Indian self-determination should be reflected at the 
state level. Gas tax revenues support tribal sovereignty by allowing tribes to assume 
many of the responsibilities and obligations associated with sovereignty. Tribes receive 
the revenue from taxes imposed on gasoline sold on the reservation, and, like the state 
of Washington, tribes are constitutionally obligated to spend those revenues on 
transportation-related projects. Gas tax agreements generate significant revenue for 
tribes and help them to build and maintain critical infrastructure on their reservations. A 
cursory glance at the most recent report from the Washington Department of Licensing 
reveals some of the extensive transportation projects embarked on in just the past two 
years, including massive improvements to roads co-managed by the State and the 
tribes, mass transit/infrastructure development on  several reservations, police services, 
and parking expansions.80 
 
Although AUTO complains that the revenues from the gas tax agreements have 
been improperly used to give the tribes an illegal competitive advantage in the highly 
regulated fuel sales market, AUTO does not include any substantive evidence of this 
practice in its complaint. Instead, AUTO includes among its exhibits such expenditures 
as a boat launch, hiking trail, and pedestrian tunnel, somehow claiming that these 
expenditures are unrelated to transportation.81 AUTO fails to include such important 
                                                            
77 See id. at 245 (referring to Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (“a waiver of 
sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed”); and see also Kiowa Tribe 
v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998) (“Tribal immunity is a matter of federal law and is not subject to 
diminution by the States.”).                                      
78 Petitioner’s Brief for Certiorari at 13, StoreVisions v. Omaha Tribe of Neb., No. 11-508 (cert. denied Jan 
09, 2012). 
79 Omaha Tribe of Neb. v. StoreVisions, 132 S.Ct. 1016 (2012) (mem).  
80 Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing, supra note 36, at 5-6. 
81 Brief of Appellant, supra note 44, at 9. 
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considerations as the fact that the tribes are subject to a regulated auditing and 
reporting requirement, which was made more stringent as a result of the 2007 
amendments to RCW 82.36.450. Also, one of the most visible reasons for the 
controversy—the apparent difference in gas prices between tribal and non-tribal 
retailers as shown in a study by the Washington Policy Center82—does not in itself 
prove that gas tax revenues are being used to subsidize prices. As the tribes argue, 
their prices are generally the same as other low-cost retailers such as Costco and 
Safeway.83 Furthermore, tribes could be reducing costs through other mechanisms, 
such as charging lower rent to retailers, engaging loyal customers, lowering overhead 
costs, and providing fewer ancillary services. While the pricing discrepancy certainly 
engages the public on the issue, nobody is asking why AUTO is not suing Costco. 
 
During a recession, everyone tends to focus on the cost issue, but it is also 
important to step back and take a look at the larger policy issue. Gas tax revenues, like 
revenues from Indian gaming and the sale of cigarettes, while obviously not the ideal 
methods of raising revenue, still help to fill the massive void created by over 200 years 
of broken treaty promises and failed federal policies toward Indians and Indian tribes. 
For example, the Swinomish tribe relinquished all claims to its traditional territory via 
treaty, and in exchange it was promised significant support from the United States.84 
Over the next 150+ years, the Swinomish struggled to provide crucial social resources 
and basic services to its members, as the support promised in the treaty never 
materialized. Today, the tribe owns and operates a very large Chevron station which 
has been highly successful .85 In 2009 and 2010, the tribe used the proceeds from its 
gas station for the following transportation improvements: 
WSDOT Roundabout Extension Project – The purpose of this $2 million project is 
to construct a new roadway extension south of SR20 from an existing roundabout 
and interchange road that serves several economic enterprises located in the 
area. Activities included preliminary engineering, design, NEPA compliance, and 
federal permitting. Tribal Staff continue to work with federal, state, and county 
agencies on this important project. 
 
Swinomish Village Road Improvements and Reconstruction – Work continued on 
various road improvement projects adjacent to tribal housing. Specifically, the 
Tribe supported improvements to correct deficiencies in the road-related storm-
water drainage system in the Swinomish Village. Activities included preliminary 
engineering, design, NEPA, and right of way. Additionally, plans were completed 
for the reconstruction of Sahalie Drive, a residential roadway. 
 
                                                            
82 Amicus Curae Memorandum of the Washington Policy Center in Support of Petition for Review at 4-5, 
Auto. United Trades Org. v. State, No. 85661-3 (filed Aug. 4, 2011). 
83 Keith Eldridge, Study: Washington Tribes Taking Unfair Advantage of Gas Tax Rebate, Oct. 6, 2011, 
5:01 PM PST, http://www.komonews.com/news/local/131299294.html?tab=video&c=y. 
84 Treaty of Point Elliott, Jan. 22, 1855, 
http://www.historylink.org/index.cfm?DisplayPage=output.cfm&File_Id=2629. 
85 SWINOMISH TRIBAL COMMUNITY HOME PAGE, see Enterprises, Chevron, 
http://www.swinomish.org/Enterprises/Chevron.aspx. 
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Tribal Road Maintenance Projects - Work on these road maintenance projects 
continues with staff meeting with engineers on preliminary design and permitting 
for surface repair of Squi Qui Lane, and for surface overlays of selected roads 
within the Swinomish Village. Activities include mowing, brush cutting, ditch 
maintenance, patch repair, crack sealing, street sweeping, equipment 
maintenance, and signage. 
 
Transportation Planning and Administration – Additional transportation planning 
work and administrative expenses related to future road projects. 
 
Police Services - Including tribal and non-tribal local government police agencies 
that provide road patrol services.86 
 
Reading this report, it is difficult to find substance in AUTO’s complaint. 
 
 However, even just a cursory glance through media commentary on the AUTO 
case reveals that the real issue is a classic misunderstanding of the fact that tribes are 
sovereign entities. For example, a recent KOMO “Problem Solvers” Investigation 
“revealed” nothing about the legal mechanisms designed to give tribes a chance to act 
as sovereigns. On the other hand, the report immediately cited the nebulous 
Washington Policy Center study (see above) and contained several quotes on the 
unfairness of the arrangement. “We're working on the skinniest margin we can, and they 
don't have to pay state tax. So that's their luck," said Mike Leake, general manager of a 
non-tribal gas station. "They use it to their advantage is what they do," said Gary 
Carpenter, a customer at a non-tribal gas station. "It's not fair.”87 A considerable number 
of other local stations and newspapers have filed similar stories and opinions, and none 
have discussed tribal sovereignty, instead preferring to focus on unfairness,88 excessive 
state overreach,89 and transparency.90 It is not surprising, therefore, that this attitude 
has spread throughout the general public, who have already been conditioned by the 
media to be suspicious of anything the state of Washington does benefitting tribes.  
 
 Not surprisingly, the tribes are facing a well-funded and extremely resourceful 
adversary in the AUTO case: the Washington business establishment. A list of amicus 
briefs submitted on behalf of AUTO reads like a who’s-who of big business in the 
state.91 Considering the amount of political influence these groups must have, it seems 
                                                            
86 Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing, supra note 36, at 10-11. 
87 ELDRIDGE, supra note 82. 
88 Erik Smith, State Will Give Tribes $427 Million in Gas Tax Money Over 10 Years, While Transportation 
Budget Runs a Billion Short, WASHINGTON STATE WIRE, Apr. 4, 2011, 
http://www.washingtonstatewire.com/home/8565-
state_will_give_tribes_427_million_in_gas_tax_money_over_10_years_while_transportation_budget_run
s_a_billion_short.htm. 
89 Id. 
90 GUTIERREZ, supra note 37. 
91 See amicus briefs submitted on behalf of AUTO by Associated General Contractors of Washington, 
Association of Washington Business, National Federation of Independent Business, Washington Oil 
Marketers’ Association, and Washington Policy Center. No amicus briefs have been submitted on behalf 
of the State. Wash. Courts Home page, 
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that they would have the resources to pursue a resolution to this issue through the 
proper forum: the ballot box. And, it seems, they have done so, as House Bill 2013 was 
introduced earlier in 2011,92 purporting to amend the RCW to require that the gas tax 
agreements conform to Washington constitutional standards requiring the use of 
highway revenue.93 However, a detailed comparison of HB 2013 and Article 40 show no 
substantive difference in how sovereigns must spend highway revenue. Instead, HB 
2013 differs from Article 40 by focusing on additional transparency, by forcing the state 
to choose an auditor in conjunction with the tribe (currently, the tribe chooses the 
auditor) and by removing the clause which currently protects the tribe’s business 
records as personal information. Even the bill’s own sponsor concedes that it will not 
pass: “I am not delusional,” State Rep. Mike Armstrong, R-Wenatchee, said. “I know this 
bill isn’t going to go anywhere. I introduced it just to have a discussion. And it sure has 
caused some discussion to take place.”94 
 
 Hopefully, as this discussion continues to take place, members of the 
Washington legislature will remember the “Promise II” President Nixon made to Indian 
people over forty years ago. The Supreme Court, while initially moving to uphold this 
promise through its strong affirmations of sovereignty, has changed direction in recent 
years. While Washington law appears solid on sovereign immunity through the 
consistent use of CR 19 by its courts, other jurisdictions are not so settled, and it is 
difficult to say how the United States Supreme Court would decide should the issue 
reach its docket again. Still, the underlying proposition embodied in Washington law is a 
strong one: disaffected citizens cannot sue sovereign entities engaged in government-
to-government negotiations, just because they do not like the outcome of those 
negotiations. AUTO and its amicus supporters should direct their efforts and 
considerable resources toward the proper forum for an adjudication of their dispute: the 
legislature and the ballot box. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
http://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts/coaBriefs/index.cfm?fa=coabriefs.briefsByTitle&courtId=A
08&firstLetter=all, scroll to “Automotive United Trades Organization v. State of Washington et al.”. 
92 H.B. 2013, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011), available at 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-  12/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/2013.pdf.    
93 See WASH. CONST. art. II, § 40. 
94 SMITH, Republicans Fume, supra note 52. 
